Book Shelf 24-11 ~ Amphibiosity curiosity in Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974 (Edward J. Erickson and Mest Uyar, Marine Corps University Press, 2020)

A newly acquired book from Marine Corps University Press grew my curiosity of amphibiosity. Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974 by Edward J. Erickson and Meset Uyar published in 2020 focuses the one of the few contested amphibious campaigns to take place post-World War II. As the back of the book describes itself:

Phase Line Attila is a study of amphibiosity with a view toward examine how the Turks successfully conducted a post-Second World War amphibious campaign in a contested environment. Phase Line Attiladetails the Turkish amphibious invasion of northern Cyprus in July 1974 and the follow-on breakout operation in August. Sometimes erroneously called Operation Attila, the operation was actually Operation Yildiz Atma-4 (Operation Star Drop-4), and it was a carefully planned and well executed joint operational level amphibious assault against a defended island. Attila was the name of the phase line associated with the campaign termination. Arguably, Operation Yildiz Atma-4 is one of only two deliberate amphibious campaigns conducted since 1945 against a well-armed enemy who actively contested the landings. – Erickson, J. and Meset Uyar (2020) Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974. Quantico: Marine Corps University Press

Amphibiosity

Erickson and Uyar start Phase Line Attila by defining “amphibiosity:”

Amphibiosity is a recently derived word that is increasingly popular among the professional practitioners of amphibious warfare in the United States. In the military sense, it describes the extent to which an organization exhibits an expeditionary mindset and an ability to conduct amphibious operations (Erickson & Uyar, p. 3). 

Phase Line Attila further characterize Operation Attila as a deliberate amphibious campaign. As the authors explain, “A campaign is a series of battles and engagements designed to achieve a strategic purpose (Erickson & Uyar, p. 4). They go on to state:

Campaigns fall broadly into two types—offensive and defensive—and within a campaign may be deliberate (a doctrinal term meaning operations that are preplanned and preresourced in a long-term planning cycle) or hasty (a doctrinal term meaning operations that are taken expeditiously in response to a window of opportunity with the resources at hand conducted with a short planning cycle) (Erickson & Uyar, pp. 4-5). 

The authors continue:

Yildiz Atma-4 was a deliberate amphibious campaign conducted against serious opposition. Its only read near-peer rival was Operation Musketeer, the Anglo-French landing at Suez in 1956. However, Operation Musketeer terminated incompletely for political reasons after only 43 hours of ground combat and was strategically unsuccessful. There were four other operational-level landings after the Second World War, the largest of which was the Chinese Communist assault on Hainan Island in 1950, which was heavily opposed and the assaulting force carried over a narrow strait supported by field artillery fires in an improvised fleet of more than 2,000 Chinese junks. The remaining operational-level campaigns include Inchon in 1950 and the Falklands in 1982, both off which were hasty operations and literally unopposed landings, and Grenada in 1983, which was also a hasty operations and very lightly opposed. In truth, since the ending of the Second World War, amphibious assault continues to be a viable form of warfare but is rare at the operational level of war (Erickson & Uyar, p. 5).

Attila atrocities

While I would agree that Phase Line Attila is an above-average study of the 1974 Turkish campaign in Cyprus, I hesitate to fully endorse the book on grounds of some perceived bias. When playing the Operation Attila scenario in a complementary wargame, Brief Border Wars by Brian Train from Compass Games (2019), the final paragraph of the Designer’s Notes talks about atrocities during the conflict noting that, “There were numerous atrocities committed by both communities during the fighting and while large numbers of displaced people shifted themselves to one side or the line or the other” (Train, Brief Border Wars, Operation Attila, Exclusive Rule 10.0 Designer’s Notes). 

The displacement of persons is given barely a mention in Phase Line Attila. As far as atrocities go, Erickson and Uyar make the case that the Turkish forces went out of their way to avoid civilian casualties. As the authors discuss the outcome of Operation Victory, the Turkish offensive in the last days of the war, they make note of this “accomplishment:”

Operation Victory was an unqualified success that was completed in three days. It might of been accomplished earlier, but the reader should remember that Cyprus was crawling with civilians, UN peacekeepers, and the press. What we now call collateral damage (the unintentional killing of noncombatants) was potentially a disastrous cause celebre for the Turks. Moreover, the Turks probably didn’t not want to lose any more men than they already had, and time was on their side. Bringing overwhelming combat power to bear in order to avoid casualties was likely more important for them than concluding the operation a day or two early (Erickson & Uyar, pp. 203-204). 

“…crawling with civilians, UN peacekeepers, and the press.” That is an interesting use of the verb “crawling.” If you find a room in your house “crawling with bugs” you are almost certainly going to exterminate them. Am I to draw the conclusion that the same should be done for civilians, UN peacekeepers, and the press? If we define “the press” as mainstream news media in America today I can see the authors point but as far as civilians and UN peacekeepers go, well, I disagree.

I would be remiss at this point not to mention that Phase Line Attila co-author Meset Uyar, PhD, might be a bit biased towards the Turkish version of history. Reading their online academic profile is interesting:

Graduate of Turkish Military Academy in 1991. Got MA on politics and Ph.D. on international relations from Faculty of Political Sciences Istanbul University. Specialized on war studies, particularly on operations other than war. As a career officers he served at platoon leader and company and battalion commander positions in various infantry units and several tours of peace support operations duties as military observer at UN mission in Georgia and as staff officer in Afghanistan. He was wounded twice in action. He served as assistant professor of international relations at the Turkish Military Academy for ten years. He was also the curator of the Military Academy Archive and Museum Division for five years where he started his research about Ottoman military history. He spent one year as an instructor and academic advisor at the Peace Support Training Center in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He worked as an associate professor of Ottoman military history at the University of New South Wales, Canberra-Australia for five years. He is currently working as a professor of international relations at the Antalya Bilim University.

Frankly, I find it a bit hard to believe that a scholar specializing in the study of operations other than war who served the UN mission in Georgia and in Afghanistan, and one who was an instructor and academic advisor that the Peace Support Training Center in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be so coldly dismissive of civilian horrors in conflict. Maybe the editor cut out those references? Who knows…

Recommended, but with some caution.

---

Feature image courtesy RMN

The opinions and views expressed in this blog are those of the author alone and are presented in a personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Navy or any other U.S. government Department, Agency, Office, or employer.

RockyMountainNavy.com © 2007-2024 by Ian B is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0